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HOW TO MAKE THE MOST OF A SHARED MEAL:
PLAN THE LAST BITE FIRST.
LIONEL LEVINE AND KATHERINE E. STANGE
Abstract. If you are sharing a meal with a companion, how best to
make sure you get your favourite mouthfuls? Ethiopian Dinner is a game
in which two players take turns eating morsels from a common plate.
Each morsel comes with a pair of utility values measuring its tastiness to
the two players. Kohler and Chandrasekaran discovered a good strategy
— a subgame perfect equilibrium, to be exact — for this game. We give
a new visual proof of their result. The players arrive at the equilibrium
by figuring out their last move first and working backward. We conclude
that it’s never too early to start thinking about dessert.
Introduction
Consider two friendly but famished acquaintances sitting down to dinner
at an Ethiopian restaurant. The food arrives on a common platter, and each
friend has his own favourite and not-so-favourite dishes among the spread.
Hunger is a cruel master, and each of our otherwise considerate companions
finds himself racing to swallow his favourites before his comrade can scoop
them up. Each is determined to maximize his own gastronomic pleasures,
and could not care less about the consequences for his companion.
An Ethiopian Dinner is a finite set
D = {m1, . . . ,mn}, with mi = (ai, bi)
whose elements are called morsels. Each morsel mi is an ordered pair of
real numbers (ai, bi). Two players, Alice and Bob, take turns removing one
morsel from D and eating it. The morsels are discrete and indivisible: each
morsel can be eaten exactly once, and the game ends when all morsels have
been eaten. The larger the value of ai, the tastier the morsel for Alice; the
larger bi, the tastier for Bob. We assume that the players know one another’s
preferences, and that the preferences are totally ordered, that is, ai 6= aj and
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bi 6= bj for i 6= j. Alice’s score is the sum of the ai for the morsels mi she
eats, while Bob’s score is the sum of the bi for the morsels mi he eats.
In such a game, the players are not adversaries; in fact, the game may
end quite peaceably and successfully for both players if they have dissimilar
tastes. The question we are interested in is this: if a player acts rationally to
maximize her own score, and assumes that her meal partner does the same,
what should be her strategy?
Eating your favourite morsel on the first move of an Ethiopian Dinner is
not necessarily a good strategy. For example, if the dinner is
D = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1)},
then Alice’s favourite morsel is (3, 1). If she takes this morsel first, then Bob
will take (2, 3), leaving Alice with (1, 2) for a total score of 4. Instead Alice
should snag (2, 3) on the first move; after Bob takes (1, 2), Alice can finish
up with (3, 1) for dessert and a total score of 5.
If deciding on the first move in an Ethiopian Dinner appears complicated,
the last move is a different matter. The subject of this paper is a strategy
discovered by Kohler and Chandrasekaran [12], which we call the crossout
strategy. Its mantra is:
“Eat your opponent’s least favourite morsel on your own last
move.”
To arrive at this strategy, each player reasons informally as follows. My
opponent will never choose her least favourite morsel, unless it is the only one
left; therefore, unless this is my last move, I can safely save my opponent’s
least favourite morsel for later.
This reasoning predicts that if, say, Bob has the last move of the game,
then Bob’s last move will be to eat Alice’s least favourite morsel. Because
this is a game of perfect information, both players can use this reasoning
to predict with certainty the game’s last move. We now cross out Alice’s
least favourite morsel from the dinner D to arrive at a smaller dinner D′
in which Alice has the last move. The same reasoning now implies that on
her last move, Alice will eat Bob’s least favourite morsel in D′. We then
cross out Bob’s least favourite morsel from D′ and proceed inductively, al-
ternately crossing out Alice’s least favourite and Bob’s least favourite among
the remaining morsels until all morsels have been crossed out. The crossout
strategy is to eat the last morsel to be crossed out.
Strategies and equilibria. To convert the informal reasoning above into
a proof that crossout is a “good strategy,” we need to define both words!
A strategy is any function s from nonempty dinners to morsels, such that
s(D) ∈ D for all nonempty dinners D. Playing strategy s means that if it
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is your turn and the remaining set of morsels is D, then you eat the morsel
s(D). For example, the Alice greedy strategy chooses the morselmi ∈ D such
that ai is largest. Either player could play this strategy. (It would be pretty
spiteful of Bob to do so!) Other examples are the “competitive” strategy
that chooses the morsel maximizing ai+ bi, the “Alice cooperative” strategy
choosing the morsel maximizing ai−bi, and the “Alice masochistic” strategy
choosing the morsel minimizing ai. A strategy can be as complicated as you
like: perhaps if the number of morsels is prime, you greedily choose your
own favourite morsel, and otherwise you spitefully choose your opponent’s
favourite.
The appropriate notion of good strategy depends on the class of games
one is considering. Ethiopian Dinner is a nonzero-sum game: one player’s
gain may not be the other’s loss. In such a game, the basic requirement of
any pair of good strategies (one for Alice, one for Bob) is that they form
a Nash equilibrium, which means that neither player can benefit himself by
changing strategies unilaterally.
A Nash equilibrium represents a stable, predictable outcome: Alice can
declare, “I am playing my equilibrium strategy, and you’d do best to play
yours.” If Bob responds rationally by playing his own equilibrium strategy,
then both players know how the game will turn out.
Subgame perfect equilibria. A game may have many equilibrium strat-
egy pairs, some with better outcomes than others, so one tends to look for
equilibria with further desirable properties. Which properties again depends
on the class of games being considered. In game theory lingo, Ethiopian Din-
ner is a perfect-information non-cooperative game in extensive form. That
is, both players know the values a1, . . . , an and b1, . . . , bn (perfect informa-
tion); the players may not bargain or make side deals (non-cooperative); and
the players alternate making moves (extensive form).
Non-cooperative games model situations in which the players have no
way of communicating (our dinner guests may be too busy stuffing their
faces to bother with conversation) or are forbidden to collude. For instance,
airlines are forbidden by law from colluding to fix prices. Colluding to fix the
outcome of a meal is still legal in most countries, but Alice might nevertheless
be dissuaded by cultural taboo from making propositions like “If you pay
me fifty cents I promise not to eat any more spinach.”
An Ethiopian Dinner with n morsels is certain to end in n moves. A widely
accepted notion of a good strategy for games of this type (perfect informa-
tion, non-cooperative, extensive form, finite length) is the subgame perfect
equilibrium. This is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium which requires that
the strategies remain in equilibrium when restricted to any subgame. In our
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Figure 1. Plot of the score pairs for all possible outcomes of
a permutation dinner D of size 14. The large dot • at upper
right represents the score Alice and Bob receive if they both
play the crossout strategy. The light dots • represent scores for
strategy pairs of the form (s, c) for s arbitrary: these are all of
the outcomes Alice can obtain playing against Bob’s crossout
strategy. According to Theorem 1, among these outcomes
she does best when she herself plays crossout. Dark dots •
represent the outcomes of all other strategy pairs. Produced
using Sage Mathematics Software [17].
case, a subgame is just a subdinner consisting of a subset of the morsels,
with the same player moving last. A subgame perfect equilibrium is robust
in the sense that even if one player, say Bob, makes a “mistake” on a partic-
ular move by deviating from his equilibrium strategy, Alice can confidently
continue playing her equilibrium strategy because the same strategy pair
is still an equilibrium of the resulting subgame. See, e.g., [15] and [16] for
background on these concepts.
Let c be the crossout strategy described above for Ethiopian Dinner. We
will give a new proof of the following theorem, which is due to Kohler and
Chandrasekaran [12].
Theorem 1. The pair (c, c) is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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In other words, if Alice plays crossout, then Bob cannot benefit himself by
playing a different strategy, and vice versa.
Figure 1 illustrates Theorem 1 in the case of a particular permutation
dinner, that is, a dinner of the form
D = {(1, b1), (2, b2), . . . , (n, bn)}
where b1, . . . , bn is a permutation of the numbers 1, . . . , n. Each dot in the
figure represents the outcome of a strategy pair, with Alice’s score plotted
on the horizontal axis and Bob’s score on the vertical axis, for the following
permutation dinner of size 14:
D ={(1, 6), (2, 14), (3, 10), (4, 3), (5, 7), (6, 5), (7, 9), (8, 8),
(9, 4), (10, 13), (11, 12), (12, 11), (13, 2), (14, 1)}.
To visualize Theorem 1, note that the large dot • in Figure 1, which repre-
sents the outcome when both players play crossout, is rightmost among all
possible outcomes achievable by Alice given that Bob plays crossout (such
outcomes are indicated by light dots •).
Recall that any function s from dinners to morsels such that s(D) ∈ D
for all dinners D counts as a strategy. In particular, let k be the number of
moves that Alice makes in D. For any subset A ⊂ D of size k, there is a
strategy pair (s, s′) such that if Alice plays s and Bob plays s′, then Alice
will eat precisely the morsels in A and Bob will eat the rest. This is how we
computed the set of all dots in Figure 1.
Part of the difficulty of proving that a pair of strategies is in equilibrium
– and also part of the power of the result once it is proved – stems from
the vast number of possible strategies. How are we to rule out that any
conceivable strategy s, which might be arbitrarily subtle, clever and com-
plicated, performs better against c than does c itself? For all we know,
Alice has access to unlimited computational resources, and her strategy s
could involve factoring enormous integers or solving large instances of the
traveling salesman problem. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 ensures that if Bob
plays c, then Alice would do at least as well playing c as s. In a sense, a
theorem about equilibrium is a theorem about the limits of intelligence: An
equilibrium enables you to hold the line against a smarter opponent!
Crossout is an efficiently computable equilibrium. In games arising
in the real world, for instance in evolutionary dynamics and in economics,
the appeal of the Nash equilibrium concept is twofold. First, it can explain
why we observe certain strategies and not others. Second, even in the case of
a game that has multiple equilibria and lacks a well-defined “best” outcome,
knowing an explicit equilibrium provides certainty. Alice simply announces
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her intention to play crossout, refers Bob to the proof of Theorem 1 and
trusts that his own best interest compels him to follow suit. What might
have been a tense evening with an unpredictable outcome becomes a more
relaxed affair in which each player can predict in advance which morsels she
will be gobbling up.
To reap these benefits, the players must be able to compute an equilibrium
pair, not just know that one exists! A recent strand of research, popularized
by the slogan “if your laptop can’t find it, then, probably, neither can the
market,” has explored the tendency for equilibria to be extremely difficult
to compute [9]. The general existence proof for subgame perfect equilibria
[15, VIII.2.10] uses a backward induction from the last move: if converted
naively into an algorithm, it would seem to require searching through expo-
nentially many move sequences in order to find an equilibrium. This kind of
brute force search is typically out of the question even for games of moderate
size (for example, an Ethiopian Dinner of n morsels has n! possible move
sequences). For this reason, it is always interesting to identify special classes
of games that have efficiently computable equilibria. The crossout equilib-
rium for Ethiopian Dinner is an example: if both players play the crossout
strategy, then they eat the morsels in reverse order of the crossouts. In this
case, the entire move sequence of the dinner can be worked out in the order
n log n time it takes to sort the two lists a1, . . . , an and b1, . . . , bn.
Proof of equilibrium
Dinners and strategies. A dinner is a finite set of morsels
D = {m1, . . . ,mn}.
Each morsel m ∈ D comes with a pair of real numbers uA(m), uB(m) repre-
senting its utility to Alice and Bob. We often write m as an ordered pair,
m = (uA(m), uB(m)) .
We adopt the convention that Bob has the final move by default. Since
moves alternate, the first move is determined by the parity of n. Alice has
the first move if n is even, and Bob has the first move if n is odd.
A strategy is a map assigning to any non-empty dinner D a morsel s(D) ∈
D to be eaten by the first player. Suppose that P ∈ {Alice, Bob} is a player,
D is a dinner, and that P plays strategy s. If it is P ’s turn to move, he
selects morsel s(D) and receives payoff uP (s(D)). The remaining dinner is
D−s(D), with his opponent to move. Suppose his opponent plays strategy t.
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The score vDP (s, t) of player P is defined by the recurrence
vDP (s, t) =

v
D−s(D)
P (s, t) + uP (s(D)) if P plays first in D,
v
D−t(D)
P (s, t) if P plays second in D,
0 if D = ∅.
(1)
where for m ∈ D, the dinner D − m denotes D with morsel m removed.
Since D has finitely many morsels, equation (1) defines vDP (s, t) uniquely.
Our convention in denoting a player’s score is that his own strategy is
always the first listed in the ordered pair.
Formally, we can regard Ethiopian Dinner as a single game whose positions
comprise all finite dinners. A pair of strategies (s, t) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium for this game if
vDA (s
′, t) ≤ vDA (s, t) and vDB (t′, s) ≤ vDB (t, s)
for all strategies s′ and t′ and all finite dinners D.
The crossout strategy. After giving the formal definition of the crossout
strategy described in the introduction, we explain how to visualize it using a
“crossout board” and prove the lemma that lies at the heart of our argument,
the Crossout Board Lemma (Lemma 2).
Let D be a set of n morsels. Write `A(D) for Alice’s least favourite morsel
in D, and `B(D) for Bob’s least favourite morsel in D. Let D1 = D, and
Di+1 = Di −mi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1
where
mi =
{
`A(Di), i odd
`B(Di), i even.
The sequence of morsels
m1,m2, . . . ,mn
is called the crossout sequence of D. Note that
m1 is Alice’s least favourite morsel in D
m2 is Bob’s least favourite morsel in D −m1
m3 is Alice’s least favourite morsel in D −m1 −m2
m4 is Bob’s least favourite morsel in D −m1 −m2 −m3
...
Now suppose D is a dinner (i.e., a set of n morsels with Bob distinguished
to move last). The crossout strategy c is defined by c(D) = mn. Note that if
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Figure 2. Left: Example of a crossout board for a dinner
D with 8 morsels. Labels on the axes indicate the crossout
sequence. Right: The crossout board for the dinner D−m, in
which a morsel m has been removed. By the Crossout Board
Lemma, each label on the right is at least as far from the
origin as the corresponding label on the left.
both players play the crossout strategy, then they eat the morsels in reverse
order of the crossout sequence:
mn = c(D)
mn−1 = c(D −mn)
mn−2 = c(D −mn −mn−1)
...
m1 = c(D −mn − · · · −m2).
Thus m1, which is Alice’s least favourite morsel in D, is eaten by Bob on
the last turn.
Crossout boards. To prepare for the proof of Theorem 1, it is convenient
to illustrate the crossout sequence with a crossout board, as in Figure 2. We
display the dinner on a Cartesian coordinate plane. Each morsel m = (a, b)
is graphed as a dot at coordinate (a, b). Since we assume that the players’
preferences are totally ordered, each vertical or horizontal line passes through
at most one morsel. The crossout sequence itself is indicated by writing the
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number (or label) i on the a-axis below mi if i is odd, and on the b-axis to
the left of mi if i is even.
Figure 2 shows the crossout board of the dinner
D = {(1, 8), (2, 3), (3, 6), (4, 4), (5, 1), (6, 2), (7, 5), (8, 7)}
and of D−m, where m is the morsel (6, 2). It is helpful to imagine placing
the labels on a crossout board one at a time in increasing order. Alice starts
at the left and scans rightward, placing the label 1 below her least favourite
morsel. Then Bob starts at the bottom and scans upward, placing the label
2 to the left of his least favourite unlabeled morsel. The players alternate
in this fashion until all morsels are labeled. Note that the labels on each
axis appear in increasing order moving away from the origin. Alice always
performs the first crossout, because of our convention that Bob has the last
move. Hence, the odd labels appear on Alice’s axis and the even labels on
Bob’s axis.
The central lemma needed to show that crossout is an equilibrium is the
following.
Lemma 2 (Crossout Board Lemma). Let D be a dinner, and D̂ ⊂ D a
subdinner. For each k = 1, . . . , |D̂| the location of label k in the crossout
board of D̂ is at least as far from the origin as the location of label k in the
crossout board of D.
Proof. Let B be the crossout board for D, with crossout sequence
m1,m2, . . . ,m|D|.
Let B̂ be the crossout board for D̂, with crossout sequence
m̂1, m̂2, . . . , m̂|D̂|.
For morsels p and q of D, we write p<D q to mean that p appears before q
in the crossout sequence for D. If p and q are also morsels of D̂, then we
write p<D̂ q to mean that p appears before q in the crossout sequence for
D̂. In particular, for any 1 ≤ j, k ≤ |D̂| we have
mj <
D
mk ⇐⇒ j < k ⇐⇒ m̂j <
D̂
m̂k. (2)
Given 1 ≤ k ≤ |D̂|, let us say k is jumpy if the label k is strictly closer to
the origin in B̂ than in B. We will show that there are no jumpy labels.
Let P be the player who places the label k (so P is Alice if k is odd, Bob
if k is even). When P places the label k on board B next to the morsel
mk, this morsel is the closest available to the origin along P ’s axis. If k
is jumpy, then the morsel m̂k is closer to the origin along P ’s axis, which
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(in B̂)
k
(in B)
• •m̂k mk
•
origin
axis
Figure 3. If label k is closer to the origin in B̂ than in B,
then m̂k must have been labeled already in B by some j < k,
i.e. m̂k<Dmk.
means that m̂k is unavailable, that is, it was already labeled in B by some
j < k (Figure 3). Hence
k is jumpy =⇒ m̂k<
D
mk. (3)
Note also that if m̂k<D̂mk, then in the crossout sequence for B̂, both m̂k
and mk are available at step k and m̂k is chosen. Therefore, the label k is
placed closer to the origin in B̂ than in B. Hence
m̂k<
D̂
mk =⇒ k is jumpy. (4)
Now suppose for a contradiction that one of the labels 1, . . . , |D̂| is jumpy,
and let k be the smallest jumpy label. Since m̂k ∈ D̂ and D̂ ⊂ D, the morsel
m̂k also belongs to D. Let j be its label on the crossout board of D; that is,
mj = m̂k. (5)
Then
k is jumpy =⇒ m̂k<
D
mk by (3)
=⇒ mj <
D
mk by (5)
=⇒ j < k by (2)
=⇒ m̂j <
D̂
m̂k by (2)
=⇒ m̂j <
D̂
mj by (5)
=⇒ j is jumpy by (4)
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Figure 4. A crossout board showing the sequence of play:
Alice eats the morsel above the label Ai on turn i, and Bob
eats the morsel to the right of the label Bj on turn j.
That is, j < k and j is jumpy. But k was the smallest jumpy label. This
contradiction shows that there are no jumpy labels, completing the proof.

The crossout scores χA(D) and χB(D) are the scores for Alice and Bob
when both play the crossout strategy:
χA(D) = v
D
A (c, c) = m2 +m4 + · · ·+m2bn/2c,
χB(D) = v
D
B (c, c) = m1 +m3 + · · ·+m2dn/2e−1.
These scores are easy to read off from the crossout board. The unlabeled
morsel locations on a player’s axis are precisely the utilities of the morsels
he eats if both players follow the crossout strategy. Therefore, the crossout
scores χA(D) and χB(D) are obtained by summing the unlabeled locations
(marked with dashes in Figure 2) on the a- and b-axes respectively. For
instance, for the board D pictured in Figure 2, we have χA(D) = 4+5+6+8
and χB(D) = 3 + 5 + 6 + 8.
If we also wish to show the order of play, then we can label the a-coordinate
of the morsel eaten by Alice in turn i with the symbol Ai, and the b-
coordinate of the morsel eaten by Bob in turn j with the symbol Bj as
shown in Figure 4. Alice’s score is the sum of the a-coordinates labeled with
A’s, and Bob’s score is the sum of the b-coordinates labeled with B’s.
In D of Figure 4 we see that Alice, who plays first, eats her favourite
morsel (8, 7) on her first turn. In the remaining game D− (8, 7), Bob moves
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first but does not eat his favourite morsel (1, 8) until his last move (for such
is Alice’s loathing for it that he can safely ignore it until the end). An
interesting property of the crossout strategy, which we leave as an exercise
to the reader since it is not needed for the proof of the main theorem, is that
if both players follow it, then the first player eventually eats her favourite
morsel.
The main lemma. The next lemma shows that neither player can improve
his crossout score by choosing a different first morsel.
Lemma 3 (Main Lemma). Let D be a dinner, and let m be a morsel of D.
Let P be the player to move first in D. Then
uP (m) + χP (D −m) ≤ χP (D).
Proof. We compare the crossout boards for D and D−m (Figure 2). In the
latter, a morsel has been removed. Player P is the second player to move in
D −m, so he swallows one fewer morsel in D −m than in D. This means
the number of labels on P ’s axis is the same in the crossout boards of D
and D −m. By the Crossout Board Lemma 2, each label on the board for
D −m is no closer to the origin than the corresponding label on the board
for D. Therefore the sum of the labeled positions on P ’s axis is at least as
large in D − m as in D. Hence the sum of the unlabeled positions on P ’s
axis is no larger in D −m than in D. For D, this sum is the crossout score
χP (D). For the board D−m, this sum consists of the score χP (D−m) plus
the utility uP (m) of the removed morsel m. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let D be a dinner of n morsels, and let c be the
crossout strategy. We induct on n to show that for any player P ∈ {A,B}
and any strategy s,
vDP (s, c) ≤ vDP (c, c).
The base case n = 1 is trivial because c is the only strategy: In a game with
one morsel, the only thing you can do is eat it!
On to the inductive step. Suppose first that P is the first player to move
in D. Let m = s(D). Then
vDP (s, c) = uP (m) + v
D−m
P (s, c) by (1)
≤ uP (m) + vD−mP (c, c) by the inductive hypothesis
≤ vDP (c, c) by Main Lemma 3.
It remains to consider the case that P is the second player to move in D.
Letting m = c(D), we have by the inductive hypothesis and (1),
vDP (s, c) = v
D−m
P (s, c) ≤ vD−mP (c, c) = vDP (c, c)
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which completes the proof.
Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed Ethiopian Dinner as a non-cooperative game, and found
an efficiently computable subgame perfect equilibrium, the crossout strategy.
Here we discuss its efficiency, and mention some variants and generalizations.
Pareto efficiency and inefficiency. An outcome of a dinner D is a par-
tition of its morsels between Alice and Bob. An outcome is called Pareto
inefficient if there exists another outcome that is at least as good for both
players and is strictly better for one of them. Equilibrium strategies may re-
sult in an outcome that is Pareto inefficient, as demonstrated by the famous
Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which both players do better by mutual coopera-
tion than by mutual defection even though mutual defection is the unique
equilibrium [15].
For the permutation dinner shown in Figure 1, we see that the crossout
outcome (c, c) is Pareto efficient because there are no dots lying (weakly)
both above and to the right of the crossout score (•). In fact, Brams and
Straffin [6, Theorem 1] prove that the crossout outcome is always Pareto ef-
ficient with respect to the “pairwise comparison” partial order on outcomes.
On the other hand, the crossout outcome is not always Pareto efficient for the
score function we have been considering, the sum of the utilities of morsels
eaten. Among permutation dinners, the smallest Pareto inefficient examples
occur for dinners of size 6, for which there are two:
D1 = {(1, 5), (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 4), (5, 6), (6, 3)},
D2 = {(1, 5), (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 3), (5, 4), (6, 6)}.
If each player employs his greedy strategy in dinner D1, then Alice’s score of
6 + 4 + 3 is equal to her crossout score, while Bob’s score of 6 + 5 + 1 is one
point better than his crossout score. The outcome that improves on crossout
for D2 is rather interesting: Bob can do one point better than his crossout
score of 11 without hurting Alice’s score, but only if Alice magnanimously
leaves him the most delicious morsel (6, 6) instead of gobbling it up on the
first bite! Bob must then return the favor by refraining from eating (3, 2)
on the fourth move. Because of the trust it requires, it is hard to imagine
the players achieving this outcome if they are not able to communicate.
To see how often crossout is Pareto inefficient, we used Sage Mathematics
Software [17] to check 10 000 randomly generated permutation dinners of
size 16 for Pareto efficiency: In all but 672 cases the (c, c) outcome was
Pareto efficient, and in all but 241 it was weakly Pareto efficient (that is,
no other outcome resulted in strict improvements for both players). The
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improvement in scores achieved by alternate outcomes was small: in an
exhaustive check of all possible game outcomes in all 10 000 dinners, the
largest improvement for any player was less than 8%. These findings provide
some evidence that the crossout strategy is reasonably efficient.
Generalized payoffs. The outcome of an Ethiopian Dinner is a partition
of the index set {1, . . . , n} into a set A = {i1, . . . , ibn/2c} of bn/2c morsels
eaten by Alice and a set B = {j1, . . . , jdn/2e} of dn/2e morsels eaten by Bob.
We have assumed that the final scores (payoffs) for Alice and Bob take the
form
pA =
∑
i∈A
ai and pB =
∑
j∈B
bj.
This particular payoff function is not essential for the argument, however.
Let
fA : Rbn/2c → R and fB : Rdn/2e → R
be functions that are strictly increasing in each coordinate, and symmetric
with respect to permutations of the coordinates. Then the Ethiopian Dinner
game with payoffs
pA = fA(ai1 , . . . , aibn/2c) and pB = fB(bj1 , . . . , bjdn/2e)
has crossout as its optimal strategy. Indeed, the proof we have given uses
only the relative order of the ai and the bj, and not their actual values.
One could also generalize the payoff function so that Alice’s payoff depends
not only on the morsels she ate but also on the morsels Bob ate, and vice
versa. A natural choice is
pA = αA
∑
i∈A
ai + βA
∑
j∈B
bj, and
pB = αB
∑
i∈A
ai + βB
∑
j∈B
bj.
That is, Alice’s payoff is αA times the sum of her own utilities of the morsels
she ate, plus βA times the sum of the utilities to Bob of the morsels Bob
ate. Bob’s payoff is defined similarly. The ratios βA/αA and αB/βB measure
the degree of altruism of the two players. The scenario of friends eating in
an Ethiopian restaurant might correspond to values of these ratios strictly
between 0 and 1. One can also imagine scenarios where βA/αA > 1: perhaps
Alice is Bob’s mother and the morsels in question are brussels sprouts.
All of these games turn out to be equivalent to Ethiopian Dinner. Suppose
we are considering the above payoffs pA and pB on the dinner D consisting
of morsels mi = (ai, bi) for i = 1, . . . , n. Translating all of a player’s utilities
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Figure 5. Crossout boards for a fully competitive and fully
cooperative dinner.
by an additive constant has no effect on strategy, so we may assume that∑n
i=1 ai =
∑n
i=1 bi = 0. Then∑
j∈B
bj = −
∑
i∈A
bi and
∑
i∈A
ai = −
∑
j∈B
aj.
Now let D′ be the dinner consisting of morsels
m′i = (αAai − βAbi, βBbi − αBai), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Any strategy s on D has a corresponding strategy s′ on D′ (which chooses
m′i whenever s chooses mi), and
pDP (s, t) = v
D′
P (s
′, t′)
for both players P ∈ {A,B}. In other words, the modified payoff in D
equals the usual Ethiopian Dinner payoff in D′. Now let s be the strategy
on D for which s′ = c (that is, s′ is the crossout strategy on D′). Then the
pair (s, s) is an equilibrium for the modified payoff dinner D.
We distinguish two extreme cases.
If αA = βB = 1 and αB = βA = −1, then the game is zero-sum. In
the terminology of combinatorial game theory, each morsel m = (a, b) is a
switch {a| − b}, so the full game is a sum of switches. The morsel (a, b)
has temperature a + b, and optimal play proceeds in order of decreasing
temperature (see [2] for background). The equivalent Ethiopian Dinner D′
has morsels (ai + bi, ai + bi) of equal appeal to both players, and crossout on
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D′ gives the same decreasing-temperature play. This dinner could result in
a couple of burned tongues!
If αA = αB = βA = βB = 1, then the game is fully cooperative. Both
players have the same goal of maximizing their joint welfare. Since the game
rules constrain them to alternate moves, the optimal play is the following.
Order the morsels m1, . . . ,mn so that ai − bi is a decreasing function of i.
Alice takes morsels m1, . . . ,mbn/2c, and Bob takes morsels mbn/2c+1, . . . ,mn.
In this case, the equivalent Ethiopian Dinner D′ has morsels (ai− bi, bi−ai)
and crossout on D′ gives the optimal strategy just described. Figure 5
shows examples of crossout boards for a zero-sum (competitive) dinner and
a cooperative dinner.
Combinatorics at the dinner table. We can measure the “cooperative-
ness” of a permutation dinner by its inversions. Let pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) be a
permutation of 1, . . . , n. For each pair of indices i < j such that pii > pij, we
call the pair (i, j) a left inversion of pi and the pair (pii, pij) a right inversion
of pi. Both players should be pleased with a permutation dinner if it has a
lot of inversions, because each inversion represents a pair of morsels mi, mj
such that Alice prefers mj while Bob prefers mi. Hopkins and Jones [11]
show that if the left inversions of pi are a subset of the left inversions of pi′,
then Alice’s crossout score for the permutation dinner pi′ is at least as good
as for pi. In fact they show more: there is a bijection between the set of
morsels Alice eats in pi and the set she eats in pi′ such that each morsel eaten
in pi′ is at least as tasty to Alice as the corresponding one in pi. (Alice prefers
a prime piece of pie to an ordinary one: after all, who wouldn’t?) Likewise,
Bob prefers dinners with a lot of right inversions. (Curiously, although right
inversions are in bijection with left inversions, set inclusion of right inversions
induces a different partial ordering on permutations than does set inclusion
of left inversions, as the reader can verify for permutations of 3 elements!)
Consider permutation dinners having an even number of morsels, n = 2k.
If we define an outcome for Alice as the set of utilities of the morsels she
eats, then the number of conceivable outcomes (over all permutation dinners
of size 2k) is the binomial coefficient
(
2k
k
)
. But not all of these outcomes are
achievable if both players play the crossout strategy. For instance, Alice
never has to eat her least favourite morsel (of utility 1), and she eats at
most one of her three least favourite morsels (of utilities 1, 2 and 3). In
general, for each j ≥ 0 she eats at most j of her 2j + 1 least favourite
morsels. Hopkins and Jones [10, 11] show that if both players play crossout,
then the number of attainable outcomes for Alice is the famous Catalan
number Ck =
1
k+1
(
2k
k
)
, and the number of attainable outcomes for Bob is
Ck+1.
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Cake cutting and envy-free division. There is a large literature on cake-
cutting [7] in which a cake (identified with the interval [0, 1]) comes equipped
with a measure for each player describing the utility to him of eating a given
piece. One problem is to find an envy-free partition of the cake, which
means that each player prefers the piece assigned to him over the pieces
assigned to the other players. When the cake is comprised of indivisible
slices (as, for example, in a game of Ethiopian Dinner), this criterion becomes
impossible to achieve in general, and finding an envy-minimizing allocation is
a hard computational problem [14]. The outcome of the crossout strategy is
reasonably close to envy-free: the first player is not envious, and the second
player’s envy is bounded by the utility of his favourite morsel. Another
way of achieving an approximately envy-free allocation is described in [14,
Theorem 2.1]. The algorithm described there is even faster than crossout,
because it does not require sorting the lists of utilities. In the case when an
envy-free allocation exists, the undercut procedure of [5] gives an algorithm
for finding one.
First move advantage. Who takes the first bite at dinner might seem of
little consequence, but imagine instead that Alice and Bob are taking turns
dividing up the assets of their great uncle’s estate. Alice, choosing first,
claims the mansion, leaving Bob to console himself with the sports car. To
reduce the advantage of moving first, Brams and Taylor [8, Ch. 3] propose
what they call “balanced alternation,” which uses the Thue-Morse sequence
A,B,B,A,B,A,A,B,B,A,A,B,A,B,B,A, . . .
as the order of turns. Alice chooses the first item, then Bob chooses the
second and third, Alice the fourth, and so on. The Thue-Morse sequence
is the unique sequence starting with A that is fixed under the operation of
replacing each term A by A,B and each term B by B,A. Here is another
definition that the reader might enjoy proving is equivalent: the terms are
indexed starting from n = 0, and the n-th term equals A or B according to
whether the sum of the binary digits of n is even or odd. Many amazing
properties of this sequence can be found in [1].
A further innovation of [8] aimed at reducing the first move advantage is
simultaneous choices. On each turn both players choose a morsel, and if they
choose distinct morsels then each eats his choice. If they choose the same
morsel, then that morsel is marked as “contested” and simultaneous play
continues with the remaining uncontested morsels. When only contested
morsels remain, the players revert to the Thue-Morse order of play.
It would be interesting to quantify the intuition that the Thue-Morse order
tends to produce a fair outcome. Some assumptions on the utilities would
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be needed: In the example of the estate, if the value of the mansion exceeds
the combined value of all the other assets, then the first player retains an
advantage no matter what.
Inducing sincerity. Mechanism design asks how the rules of a game should
be structured in order to induce the players to act in a certain way. A
common goal is to induce the players to make sincere choices – that is,
choices in line with their actual preferences. For example, the voter who
deserts his preferred candidate for one he deems has a better chance of
winning is making an insincere choice. Making sincere choices in Ethiopian
Dinner means playing the greedy strategy of always eating your favourite
available morsel. Because the greedy strategy pair is not an equilibrium,
the players have an incentive to make insincere choices by playing the more
complicated crossout strategy. How could the rules of Ethiopian Dinner be
modified so as to make the greedy strategy pair an equilibrium? Brams and
Kaplan [4] (see also [3, ch. 9]) design a mechanism that allows the players
of an Ethiopian Dinner to offer one another trades, and show that its effect
is to make the greedy strategy pair an equilibrium.
Open questions
We conclude by describing a few natural variants that we do not know
how to analyze.
Delayed gratification. Suppose that the utilities uA(m) and uB(m) de-
pend not only on the morsel m, but also on when it is eaten. A natural
choice is to value a morsel eaten on turn i with λi times its usual value,
for a parameter λ < 1. Thus, a morsel declines in value the longer it re-
mains on the plate (perhaps the delicate flavours are fading). The choice of
exponential decay λi corresponds to the common assumption in economics
that a payoff received in the future should be discounted to its net present
value according to the prevailing interest rate. If the interest rate is α, then
λ = 1/(1 + α). In the resulting game, each player feels an urgency to eat
her favourites early on. Because time-sensitive payoffs break the symme-
try assumption, our proof of equilibrium does not apply. Can the crossout
strategy be modified to produce an equilibrium?
Inaccessible morsels. Ethiopian food is served atop injera, a layer of
spongy bread that can only be eaten once it is revealed. If the game is
played with the requirement that the order of consumption must respect a
fixed partial ordering on the morsels, the crossout strategy may not be an
allowable strategy. What should take its place?
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Imperfect information. How should your dinner strategy change if you
don’t know your opponent’s preferences? Perhaps the morsels come in dif-
ferent types and there are many identical morsels of each type. Then you
might start by playing greedily, while trying to infer your opponent’s pref-
erences from his play. Once you start to form a picture of his preferences,
you can start playing a crossout-style strategy. Bob seems to be staying
away from the spinach, so you can probably leave it for later. But was it an
honest signal when he ate all those chickpeas? Can deceit pay in a dinner
of imperfect information?
Three’s a crowd. Ethiopian Dinner resembles the process of draft picks
in sports. Each team participating in the draft has its own belief about
how much each player is worth, and the teams draft players one at a time
according to some predetermined order of play. Typically, many teams (more
than two!) participate in the draft. Brams and Straffin [6] point out a
number of pathologies in the case when the number of teams is greater than
two. For example, it may be to a team’s advantage to choose later in the
draft. For players with certain specific preferences (called “gallant knights”
in [13]) the crossout strategy applies to games with any number of players.
But the crossout strategy does not seem to apply to games of three or more
self-interested players, which leads us to end with a question. Is there an
efficiently computable equilibrium for Ethiopian Dinner with three or more
players?
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